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A SKEPTICAL ATTITUDE ABOUT  
PRODUCT LIABILITY IS JUSTIFIED: A REPLY TO 
PROFESSORS GOLDBERG AND ZIPURSKY 
A. Mitchell Polinsky
 and Steven Shavell
 
In The Uneasy Case for Product Liability,1 we maintained that the 
benefits of product liability are likely to be less than its costs for many 
products, especially widely sold ones.  Our article was intended to alter 
the dominant view held by the judiciary and commentators that prod-
uct liability has a clear justification on grounds of public policy.  We 
argued instead that a skeptical attitude toward product liability should 
be adopted. 
Professors John Goldberg and Benjamin Zipursky strongly criticize 
our article in The Easy Case for Products Liability Law: A Response to 
Professors Polinsky and Shavell.2  To a significant extent, however, 
they attack a straw man, for they impute to us a radical thesis — that 
product liability should be eliminated for all widely sold products3 — 
that we manifestly did not advance.  In fact, we argued that whether 
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  1  A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Uneasy Case for Product Liability, 123 HARV. 
L. REV. 1437 (2010). 
  2  John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Easy Case for Products Liability Law: A 
Response to Professors Polinsky and Shavell, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1919 (2010). 
  3  They say, for example, that “the burden of Uneasy is to defend the . . . ambitious claim that 
products liability law . . . is unjustified — that is that any and all tort liability for injuries caused 
to consumers by widely sold products should be eliminated.”  Id. at 1925–26.  Likewise, they state 
that “Uneasy . . . generates the striking conclusion that a consumer injured by a widely sold prod-
uct should not recover in tort from the manufacturer.”  Id. at 1927.  In their discussion of the 
reform of law, they refer at one point to our recommendation as “the elimination of liability for 
injuries to consumers caused by widely sold products,” id. at 1941, and at another point as “an 
abandonment of tort law for widely used consumer products,” id. at 1942.  Sometimes they de-
scribe our recommendation in a slightly less radical way.  For instance, in their introduction they 
represent our claim to be “that it is probably desirable for manufacturers not to be subject to any 
tort liability for injuries caused to consumers by widely sold products.”  Id. at 1921 (emphasis in 
original).  While this version of their statement of our position is softened by the word “probably,” 
it nonetheless mischaracterizes our position because we do not say in our article that there is any 
possibility that product liability should be eliminated for all widely sold products. 1950  HARVARD LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 123:1949 
product liability is undesirable depends on the particular product.4  
Goldberg and Zipursky also ascribe to us other opinions that exagger-
ate what we said in our article — notably, they state that we believe 
that product liability has no beneficial effect on product safety for 
widely sold products.5  It is not surprising, therefore, that they are un-
able to support these mischaracterizations with citations to statements 
in our article.6 
The major claim that Goldberg and Zipursky develop is that our 
benefit-cost analysis fails to demonstrate that the case for product lia-
bility is uneasy.7  In our view, their critique is deficient on multiple ac-
counts, including that it contains numerous distortions and errors, and 
hence does not alter our original conclusion. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  4  In the abstract of our article we said that the use of product liability will be “often unwar-
ranted,” not always unwarranted, on account of a consideration of the benefits and costs of prod-
uct liability.  Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 1, at 1438.  In the second paragraph of our Introduc-
tion, we similarly said that the benefits of product liability are likely to be outweighed by their 
costs “for many products,” but not for all products.  Id. at 1440.  In the beginning of Part VI, 
which summarized and concluded our benefit-cost analysis, we said that “[w]e are focusing here 
on central tendencies” and that, “as the reader knows, the assessment of benefits and costs will not 
be uniform within each category of products [widely sold products and products that are not 
widely sold].”  Id. at 1472. 
  5  See infra pp. 1956–57. 
  6  With only one exception, the assertions quoted from their response in supra note 3 are not 
accompanied by footnotes with citations to our article.  Moreover, the single exception, a footnote 
intended to support the italicized quotation in supra note 3, does not make sense.  In that foot-
note, Goldberg and Zipursky correctly quote us as saying that, in light of our analysis, legislation 
might be contemplated “that would limit or eliminate product liability in certain industries or for 
certain widely sold products.”  Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 2, at 1921 n.17 (quoting Polinsky 
& Shavell, supra note 1, at 1492).  But our statement that mentions the possibility of eliminating 
product liability in certain industries or for certain widely sold products obviously does not sup-
port their claim that we contemplate eliminating product liability for all widely sold products. 
  7  See id. at 1922.  They also advance other arguments for product liability, notably that it is 
warranted by a relevant notion of justice, independently of its standard public policy benefits.  Id. 
at 1944–48.  In their view, justice is promoted if a manufacturer that introduces a product into the 
stream of commerce is held responsible for injuries caused by its defects.  Id. at 1943–44.  Al-
though we limit our discussion in the text of this reply to the conventional benefits and costs of 
product liability, we observe here that Goldberg and Zipursky ignore three important issues bear-
ing on the applicability of the justice rationale for product liability to which they refer.  One issue 
is whether firms’ employees or firms themselves should be viewed as moral actors.  Compare Pe-
ter A. French, The Corporation as a Moral Person, in COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY 133 (Lar-
ry May & Stacey Hoffman eds., 1991) (maintaining that corporations can be held morally account-
able for their acts), with Manuel G. Velasquez, Why Corporations Are Not Morally Responsible 
for Anything They Do, in COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY, supra, at 111 (arguing that only em-
ployees can be morally responsible for their acts).  If employees are the sole moral actors, justice 
would require that culpable employees be penalized, not the firm as an entity.  The second issue 
of relevance to the justice rationale for product liability is the extent to which firms’ ownership of 
liability insurance dilutes the achievement of justice, because insured firms do not directly pay for 
the harms they cause.  See, e.g., LOUIS  KAPLOW  &  STEVEN  SHAVELL,  FAIRNESS  VERSUS 
WELFARE 114–15 (2002).  And the third issue is the degree to which first-party insurance inter-
feres with the achievement of justice, because subrogation often results in insurers rather than 
plaintiffs receiving tort payments.  See id. 2010]  A SKEPTICAL ATTITUDE  1951 
We begin in Part I by considering the safety benefit of product lia-
bility, namely, that it spurs firms to reduce product risks.  A central 
point of our article was that this benefit is incremental in character.  It 
consists only of the steps that product liability induces firms to take to 
reduce accident risks beyond those that they already take in response 
to market forces (to avoid losses in sales if their products injure cus-
tomers) and to comply with safety regulation.  We argued in our article 
that market forces and regulation often contribute in a significant way 
to product safety, particularly for widely sold products, and thus that 
the safety benefit of product liability might not be great. 
Goldberg and Zipursky do not dispute our basic observation that 
the safety benefit of product liability is incremental in nature; they do 
not deny that market forces and regulation are often important deter-
minants of product safety.  What they do contend, however, is that the 
magnitude of the safety benefit of product liability is large, notwith-
standing that it is incremental.  We explain why the various arguments 
that they present to support this view are problematic.  In doing so, we 
address their criticisms of our discussion of several empirical studies — 
involving general aviation aircraft, motor vehicles, and childhood vac-
cines — that fail to find that product liability has a measurable effect 
on product safety.  We observe that their evaluation of these studies is 
incomplete, reflects questionable judgments about the interpretation of 
empirical work, and contains errors.  Significantly, Goldberg and Zi-
pursky do not cite any study demonstrating that product liability has 
led to a decrease in product accident rates.8  In the end, we see no rea-
son to modify our conclusion that the safety benefit of product liability 
is incremental and that it is often small, especially for widely sold 
products for which market forces and regulation are strong. 
In Part II we examine the second major benefit of product liabili-
ty — that it compensates victims of product-related accidents for their 
harms.  As we stressed in our article, the compensation benefit also is 
incremental, because victims of product-related accidents already often 
receive substantial compensation from private and public insurance.  
Moreover, due to subrogation provisions in insurance contracts, as well 
as other factors, the product liability system adds much less to victims’ 
compensation than the amounts that firms pay in settlements or judg-
ments.  Again, Goldberg and Zipursky do not dispute our basic points.  
However, they argue that the magnitude of the compensation benefit is 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  8  They do, however, make the false claim that such empirical studies are discussed in Daniel 
P. Kessler & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Empirical Study of the Civil Justice System, in 1 HANDBOOK 
OF LAW  AND ECONOMICS 343, 363 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007).  See 
Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 2, at 1931–32.  But Kessler and Rubinfeld do not mention any 
empirical studies that show that product liability has led to a decrease in product accident rates.  
See infra notes 32–37. 1952  HARVARD LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 123:1949 
large, even though it is incremental; and they criticize our analysis of 
the detrimental effects of awarding damages for pain and suffering.  
We explain why we find their assertions unconvincing or incorrect. 
In Part III we discuss the comparison of the benefits of product 
liability to its costs.9  We noted in our article that the legal costs of the 
product liability system are large — they approximate the amount that 
victims receive in compensation.  We observed that employing the 
product liability system to compensate victims is like using an ATM 
that imposes a service charge of $100 for every $100 a person with-
draws from it.  We also discussed indirect costs of product liability 
stemming from the price increases it induces, which can undesirably 
discourage consumers from buying products.  The high costs of prod-
uct liability, combined with the points that the safety and compensa-
tion benefits are incremental and often small, led us to the judgment 
that product liability may well be undesirable for many products. 
Despite the obvious importance of the costs of the product liability 
system, Goldberg and Zipursky do not discuss them.  Nonetheless, 
they press the assertion that the case for product liability is easy to 
make.  It is surprising that Goldberg and Zipursky should do this be-
cause, of course, it is illogical to conclude that the case for product lia-
bility is easy to make without taking into account its costs — unless 
they believe that the costs of product liability are irrelevant to its   
evaluation. 
A theme of Goldberg and Zipursky’s response is that we must meet 
a heavy burden of persuasion to justify our skeptical attitude toward 
product liability.  We believe, however, that the burden on us is weak.  
In a major part of our article, not commented upon by Goldberg and 
Zipursky, we documented the conclusory nature of the policy argu-
ments for product liability offered by courts and most commentators.  
That essentially no serious policy rationale for product liability has 
been provided by them implies that the burden on us to challenge the 
status quo is not great.  It should not be difficult to cast doubt on a 
policy position that has no real basis — that is not supported by a de-
veloped body of arguments and facts.  We believe that the analysis 
that we offered and the evidence that we presented amply support our 
conclusion that the case for product liability is uneasy. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  9  In our article we also considered the price-signaling benefit of product liability  — that 
product liability can improve consumer purchase decisions by causing product prices to increase 
to reflect product risks.  See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 1, at 1459–62.  Because Goldberg and 
Zipursky do not address this benefit other than to summarize it in a footnote, see Goldberg & Zi-
pursky, supra note 2, at 1926 n.32, we do not discuss it here. 2010]  A SKEPTICAL ATTITUDE  1953 
I.  THE SAFETY BENEFIT OF PRODUCT LIABILITY 
The main point that we developed in our article concerning the 
safety benefit of product liability is, as we noted above, that it is of an 
incremental nature because safety improvements will often already be 
stimulated by market forces or required by regulation.  We amplified 
this point through a qualitative discussion of ways in which market 
forces and regulation work to generate safety, as well as through a re-
view of empirical studies of the effect of product liability on product 
safety.  Goldberg and Zipursky criticize our analysis on three grounds.  
The first concerns whether the present level of regulation should be 
taken as given in assessing the contribution of product liability to safe-
ty.  The second relates to our qualitative discussion of market forces 
and regulation.  The third involves our assessment of empirical studies 
of product liability.  As we explain, their various arguments are prob-
lematic or incorrect. 
A.  Should We Have Taken the  
Present Level of Regulation as Given? 
In assessing the contribution of product liability to product safety, 
we took other factors that affect product safety as given.  We said that 
“we consider the desirability of product liability against the back-
ground of the world as we find it, including the way in which market 
forces and regulation now operate.”10  This assumption was natural to 
make — in evaluating a particular policy, it is standard to take other 
policies as given — and we specifically noted that a more complicated 
inquiry was beyond the scope of our article.11 
Nevertheless, Goldberg and Zipursky fault us for not having asked 
how much product liability would enhance product safety if regulation 
were nonexistent, and they imply that product liability would then 
contribute more to safety than it does now because it would not be in-
cremental.12  It is undoubtedly true that product liability would add 
more to product safety if there were no regulation.  However, as   
we suggested in our article, if one wanted to determine how much 
product liability would encourage product safety were regulation dif-
ferent from that today, a more appropriate investigation would involve 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  10  Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 1, at 1443 n.12. 
  11  See id. 
  12  They write: 
[E]ven if one were to grant that tort law offers no incremental deterrent effect, this con-
cession provides no grounds for the ultimate conclusion of Uneasy.  Rather it provides 
an argument against redundant incentivizing.  This is just as much an argument for 
dismantling the regulatory regime governing product safety as it is an argument for get-
ting rid of tort law . . . . 
Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 2, at 1931. 1954  HARVARD LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 123:1949 
consideration of improved or optimal regulation as a benchmark, not 
no regulation.13 
Furthermore, if regulation could be modified in a desirable way, it 
is not clear that regulation would be less strong than it is currently.  
One might believe that regulation should be strengthened to offset its 
reduced effectiveness due to imperfections of the political process, in-
cluding the capture of regulatory agencies.  Thus, were we to evaluate 
the role of product liability relative to a different and better regulatory 
regime, it is plausible that product liability would have a less impor-
tant role in promoting product safety than we found in our article.14 
B.  Our Qualitative Discussion of  
the Safety Benefit of Product Liability 
In our discussion of the effect of market forces on product safety, 
we cited numerous examples in which consumer demand for a product 
declined dramatically after consumers learned of its dangers, as well as 
examples in which demand for a product rose as a consequence of con-
sumer beliefs about its desirable safety characteristics.15  Goldberg and 
Zipursky dismiss these examples as anecdotes16 but do not question 
their validity. 
We also catalogued ways in which consumers can obtain informa-
tion about product risks through newspapers, magazines, the broadcast 
media, and the internet.17  We acknowledged that consumers’ ability 
to absorb this volume of information is limited and that their evalua-
tion of it is subject to cognitive problems.18  Goldberg and Zipursky do 
not disagree with our description of the product safety information 
available to consumers, but say that we should have paid greater at-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  13  See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 1, at 1443 n.12. 
  14  Similarly, if we evaluated the proper scope of product liability when consumer access to in-
formation about product risks is desirably modified, we might also discover that product liability 
would be less valuable than we judged it to be in our article.  Probably at modest expense, the 
government could create enhanced public websites with up-to-date tracking of product problems 
for most widely sold products and for many others.  In fact, the government is proceeding to es-
tablish a website of this sort.  See U.S. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n, SaferProducts.gov, 
http://www.saferproducts.gov (last visited May 7, 2010) (describing a “publicly accessible, search-
able database of consumer product incident reports” that is intended to be operational by March 
11, 2011, id. at http://www.saferproducts.gov/timeline.html).  In a world in which information 
about product risks is easier to obtain, firms would face stronger market penalties for selling dan-
gerous products and would obtain greater rewards for making safer products.  Thus, the likely 
contribution of product liability to product safety would be diminished. 
  15  See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 1, at 1443–45. 
  16  See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 2, at 1922 (“The evidence [Uneasy] marshals is sur-
prisingly scant, consisting of anecdotes about products that suffered declining sales after being 
linked to certain injuries . . . .”). 
  17  See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 1, at 1445–48. 
  18  See id. at 1448–49. 2010]  A SKEPTICAL ATTITUDE  1955 
tention to the difficulties that consumers face in making use of it.19  
Additionally, we emphasized that consumers are likely to have better 
information about the safety of widely sold goods because the media 
tends to give these goods more attention than goods that are not wide-
ly sold.20  Goldberg and Zipursky do not criticize this hypothesis. 
We then described several significant areas of safety regulation — 
pertaining to automobiles, pharmaceuticals, aircraft, and consumer 
products — and observed that some safety regulations have been 
found to have reduced product risks.21  We noted as well that regula-
tion is likely to be more effective with respect to widely sold products 
than other products because regulators will be more concerned with 
widely sold products and will be better able to obtain information 
about their risks.22  Goldberg and Zipursky do not dispute these 
points.  Rather, they say that we placed too little weight on the prob-
lems afflicting regulation,23 even though we acknowledged that regula-
tors face various difficulties (due to limited information, budgetary 
constraints, and capture by industry) and that regulation may not be  
successful.24 
Goldberg and Zipursky also mention that product liability litiga-
tion can promote safety indirectly, by focusing the attention of con-
sumers and regulators on product dangers.25  We recognized this in-
formational role of product liability in our article.26  H o w e v e r ,  o n e  
might question its significance for widely sold products because prob-
lems with such products are more likely to be discovered even in the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  19  See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 2, at 1929. 
  20  See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 1, at 1449. 
  21  See id. at 1452. 
  22  See id. 
  23  See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 2, at 1930. 
  24  See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 1, at 1453.  Specifically, we said: 
Of course, regulation will be far from perfect due to the limited knowledge of regulators, 
their budgetary constraints, and the possibility that they may be captured by the firms 
that they are responsible for overseeing.  Consistent with these observations, some stud-
ies have found regulation to be ineffective or of limited value in certain contexts. 
Id. (footnote omitted).  Notwithstanding this statement, Goldberg and Zipursky assert that: 
The reader [of Uneasy] is left with the false impression that, on balance, . . . the Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA) and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administra-
tion (NHTSA) operate free from political influence, budgetary constraints, dependency 
on regulated entities for information, and the inherent limitations of ex ante regulation. 
Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 2, at 1930. 
  25  See id. at 1930–31. 
  26  See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 1, at 1454–55, where we said: 
Another reason that product liability could be effective is indirect — that product liabili-
ty litigation may result in publicity about product problems and thereby enhance market 
forces and spur regulation.  If adverse reactions to a drug would not come to the atten-
tion of the media or regulators unless product liability suits were brought, then product 
liability could be responsible for lower sales of the drug and regulatory action to remedy 
its dangers. 1956  HARVARD LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 123:1949 
absence of litigation, due to their pervasive use.  Moreover, the empiri-
cal studies that we discussed in our article, and revisit in section I.C 
below, suggest that the informational role of product liability litigation 
is not important.  Specifically, if such litigation had a substantial im-
pact on product safety through the dissemination of information   
to consumers and regulators about product risks, the studies should 
have found that greater product liability activity is associated with 
lower accident rates; but this relationship is not evident in the studies’ 
findings. 
To summarize, Goldberg and Zipursky do not challenge our quali-
tative points that market forces and regulation already often provide 
considerable safety benefits — implying that the safety benefit of 
product liability is much less than would otherwise be supposed.  In-
stead, they criticize us for not placing enough weight on limitations to 
our arguments, even though we discussed the very limitations that 
they emphasize. 
C.  Empirical Studies of the Effect  
of Product Liability on Product Safety 
We considered in our article all of the empirical literature that we 
could locate that sought to identify the effect of product liability on 
product accident rates, and we focused attention on studies that were 
concerned with specific products.  These products were general avia-
tion aircraft, motor vehicles, and childhood vaccines.27  In none of the 
studies did researchers find that increased product liability litigation 
resulted in a measurable decrease in accident rates.28  The researchers 
failed to uncover a beneficial effect of product liability on product 
safety even though product liability litigation increased greatly during 
the periods studied (spanning the 1970s and 1980s). 
Goldberg and Zipursky criticize our discussion of these studies on 
several accounts.  In this section, we explain that their observations 
about this literature, and about what we said regarding it, contain er-
rors, misleading statements, and questionable judgments concerning 
the interpretation of statistical results. 
To begin, Goldberg and Zipursky misstate what we concluded from 
the empirical studies.  They assert that we make the “improbable 
claim that widely sold products would be as safe if . . . tort liability to 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  27  See id. at 1455–58. 
  28  See id. (citing Andrew Craig, Product Liability and Safety in General Aviation, in THE 
LIABILITY MAZE 456 (Peter W. Huber & Robert E. Litan eds., 1991); John D. Graham, Product 
Liability and Motor Vehicle Safety, in THE LIABILITY MAZE, supra, at 120; Robert Martin, 
General Aviation Manufacturing: An Industry Under Siege, in THE LIABILITY MAZE, supra, at 
478; Richard L. Manning, Changing Rules in Tort Law and the Market for Childhood Vaccines, 37 
J.L. & ECON. 247 (1994)). 2010]  A SKEPTICAL ATTITUDE  1957 
consumers for product-related injuries were abolished.”29  We did not 
make such a claim.30  Our conclusions from the empirical studies were 
carefully qualified.  In essence, we said that the studies suggested that 
the effect of product liability on product safety would likely be small 
in industries similar to those studied, but that the effect might be 
greater for the average widely sold product.31 
Goldberg and Zipursky also incorrectly describe other scholars’ re-
views of empirical studies of the effect of product liability on product 
safety.  They state that “two prior literature reviews — one published 
by Professor Mark Geistfeld in 2009, the other by Professors Daniel 
Kessler and Daniel Rubinfeld in 2007 — have already addressed the 
same empirical studies” that we do.32  However, neither of these re-
views considers the studies of all three of the products that we dis-
cussed.  Geistfeld mentions only automobiles,33 and Kessler and Ru-
binfeld discuss only general aviation aircraft.34   Goldberg and 
Zipursky also claim that Kessler and Rubinfeld point out that some 
studies have found that product liability leads to an improvement in 
product safety, yet this claim too is untrue.35  Additionally, Goldberg 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  29  Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 2, at 1934. 
  30  The passage just quoted from Goldberg and Zipursky’s response is not accompanied by a 
supporting citation to our article.  In an earlier part of their response they similarly suggest that 
we believe that “tort law as applied to products does nothing at all to induce manufacturers to 
make safer products.”  Id. at 1928 (emphasis in original).  They do provide a footnote there refer-
encing our article that is intended to support their claim: “See [Uneasy] at 22 (speculating that 
products liability produces only a ‘small’ safety benefit for widely sold products).”  Id. at 1928 
n.35.  Aside from the fact that this footnote does not accurately represent our position, it obvious-
ly contradicts their assertion that we believe that product liability “does nothing at all” to improve 
product safety. 
  31  Specifically, we stated that the findings of these industry studies “support the prediction that 
the safety benefit of product liability for many other widely sold products — those for which 
market forces and regulation have similar importance — will be small,” but that “market forces 
and regulation may be more significant for general aviation aircraft, automobiles, and childhood 
vaccines than for the average widely sold product, implying that the safety benefit of product lia-
bility may be lower for these industries than more generally.”  Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 1, at 
1458. 
  32  Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 2, at 1931 (footnotes omitted). 
  33  See Mark A. Geistfeld, Products Liability, in T ORT LAW  AND ECONOMICS § 11.11, at 
302–03 (Michael Faure ed., 2d ed. 2009) (discussing the study by Professor John Graham of the 
effect of product liability on automobile accident rates).  While Geistfeld also mentions two stud-
ies by Richard Manning on product liability and childhood vaccines, it is only to note Manning’s 
findings about the impact of liability on vaccine prices, not on accident rates.  Id. at 304. 
  34  Kessler and Rubinfeld, supra note 8, at 363, address the study by Robert Martin of the ef-
fect of product liability on general aviation accident rates, supra note 28; they do not discuss the 
Andrew Craig study of general aviation aircraft, supra note 28, the Graham study of automobiles, 
supra note 28, or the Manning study of childhood vaccines, supra note 28. 
  35  Goldberg and Zipursky say that Kessler and Rubinfeld, supra note 8, at 363, report that 
“some studies have found a deterrent effect” of product liability.  Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 
2, at 1931 n.57.  But on that page of Kessler and Rubinfeld’s article (containing the relevant dis-
cussion of deterrence), the only studies of the deterrent effect of product liability on accident rates 
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and Zipursky describe the authors of the surveys as being agnostic 
about the effect of product liability, and they imply that we misinter-
preted the authors as concluding that product liability does not affect 
product safety.36  Goldberg and Zipursky do not mention, however, 
that we observed that Geistfeld and Kessler and Rubinfeld criticize the 
empirical studies that they review.37  We believe that a careful reader 
will find that we did not misinterpret these authors. 
As to the studies of the three products themselves, Goldberg and 
Zipursky discuss only Professor John Graham’s analysis of automobile 
safety.  Graham investigated whether the increase in automobile-
related product liability litigation between 1950 and 1988 led to a re-
duction in the automobile accident fatality rate, and he did not find 
any statistically discernible effect.38  Not only do Goldberg and Zi-
pursky neglect to report Graham’s statistical result, they actually im-
ply that he came to a contrary conclusion.39 
Nonetheless, Goldberg and Zipursky complain that Graham’s 
measure of liability activity was less than ideal and that his indicator 
of the accident rate was the fatality rate rather than a more compre-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
that are mentioned are those by Professor George Priest and Robert Martin.  Kessler and Rubin-
feld state that Priest “concludes that the expansion of product liability had minimal (if any) bene-
ficial effects on accident avoidance.”  Kessler & Rubinfeld, supra note 8, at 363.  They say that 
Martin “finds sharper declines in the aviation accident rate from 1950–69 than from 1970–89,” id., 
which is the opposite of what would be expected if the expansion of product liability in the latter 
period reduced accident rates. 
  36  See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 2, at 1931. 
  37  See  Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 1, at 1458 n.90.  In a similar vein, Goldberg and 
 Zipursky claim that Professors Don Dewees, David Duff, and Michael Trebilcock are agnostic 
about the effect of product liability on product safety and they imply that we overlooked this 
point.  See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 2, at 1933 (discussing DON DEWEES, DAVID DUFF 
&  MICHAEL  TREBILCOCK,  EXPLORING  THE  DOMAIN  OF  ACCIDENT  LAW ( 1996)).  But 
Goldberg and Zipursky do not acknowledge that we observed that Dewees, Duff, and Trebilcock 
criticize the study by Priest that they review.  See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 1, at 1455 n.66, 
1458 n.90.  Moreover, Goldberg and Zipursky do not mention that Dewees, Duff, and Trebilcock 
state, in the topical sentence of the paragraph from which Goldberg and Zipursky draw quota-
tions supporting their claim that Dewees, Duff, and Trebilcock are agnostic, the following: “Ag-
gregated empirical analysis . . . suggests that increased product liability has not led to any de-
crease in product-related accidents.”  DEWEES, DUFF & TREBILCOCK, supra, at 205. 
  38  Graham, supra note 28, actually observed that greater product liability activity was asso-
ciated with a higher accident rate, but the effect was not statistically significant.  See id. at 182–
83.  See also infra note 46 and accompanying text. 
  39  They say the following: 
In an effort to refine these gestalt judgments [based on particular automobile safety 
events], the Graham article also looks for a statistical correlation between increases in 
the incidence of so-called “crashworthiness” liability for automobile-accident injuries 
and reductions in such injuries.  By this method, it finds that products liability law “is 
one of several forces that induce manufacturers to consider making pro-safety decisions 
in the marketplace,” and that “[i]n some cases  .  .  .  liability seemed to cause safety 
improvements to occur more quickly than they would have occurred in the absence of 
liability.” 
Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 2, at 1928 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 2010]  A SKEPTICAL ATTITUDE  1959 
hensive accident rate.40  But the use of imperfect measures of variables 
when better alternatives are not available is commonplace in empirical 
work.  Moreover, because the rates of fatal and nonfatal accidents are 
obviously strongly correlated, it is unlikely that the rate of nonfatal ac-
cidents decreased, or decreased by very much, when the rate of fatal 
accidents did not decline. 
In addition to his statistical analysis, Graham undertook five de-
tailed case studies of automobile safety problems (including, for exam-
ple, gas tanks in Ford Pintos that were prone to explode in acci-
dents).41  In doing so, he attempted to identify in a qualitative way the 
contribution made by product liability to automobile safety.  Goldberg 
and Zipursky describe Graham’s conclusions from these case studies as 
indicating that product liability was often a contributing factor to the 
adoption of safety improvements42 and may have hastened some im-
provements.43  That is a correct reporting of what Graham said, as we 
too stated,44 but it is seriously incomplete. 
In particular, Graham made three other significant observations 
that cast product liability in a far less favorable light and that Gold-
berg and Zipursky do not mention.  First, Graham stated that “[i]n no 
case did we conclude that liability considerations were necessary to 
stimulate a specific safety improvement.”45  Second, Graham said that, 
although “liability is sometimes a contributing pro-safety factor” in the 
case studies, a statistical analysis of “passenger car occupant fatalities 
for the years 1950 to 1988” indicates that “any beneficial impact of lia-
bility is too small and subtle to be detected.”46  Third, when Graham 
offered recommendations for the improvement of automobile safety, he 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  40  See id. at 1928 n.39. 
  41  Graham’s five case studies account for the bulk of his long article — fifty-five of its sixty-
seven pages of text.  His study of Ford Pinto gas tank problems is approximately ten pages in 
length.  Yet Goldberg and Zipursky describe Graham as “briefly recounting episodes such as the 
Ford Pinto gas-tank ruptures.”  Id. at 1928. 
  42  See id.  Goldberg and Zipursky write that Graham’s study “speculates for each [safety im-
provement] whether products liability law ‘was a necessary, sufficient, contributing, or insignifi-
cant cause of safety improvements,’ concluding that in most instances ‘liability was a contributing 
factor in achieving safety improvements.’”  Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting Graham, supra note 28, 
at 180–81). 
  43  See id.  Goldberg and Zipursky quote the following passage from the Graham article: “[i]n 
some cases . . . liability seemed to cause safety improvements to occur more quickly than they 
would have occurred in the absence of liability.”  Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Graham, 
supra note 28, at 183–84). 
  44  See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 1, at 1457 & n.83.  We observed that Graham “noted . . . 
that product liability might have been sufficient to induce certain safety improvements or at least 
to have hastened them, especially because the adverse publicity accompanying litigation can spur 
market forces.”  Id. at 1457 (footnote omitted). 
  45  Graham, supra note 28, at 180. 
  46  Id. at 182–83.  The reference in the text is to the statistical study by Graham that we de-
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identified two strategies that he described as “particularly promising,” 
namely, “provision of better safety information to consumers and a re-
vitalized federal regulatory process.”47  He did not suggest expanding 
the use of product liability.48 
It is thus evident that Graham’s overall judgment is that product 
liability has played a minor role in promoting automobile safety and 
that he does not advocate its greater use.  The impression of Graham’s 
views conveyed by Goldberg and Zipursky is based on highly selective 
citations to his article and is, in our opinion, inexcusably misleading. 
Goldberg and Zipursky also criticize us for placing too much 
weight on studies of general aviation aircraft and childhood vaccines 
because, they say, these are atypical products.49  They appear to be-
lieve that aircraft are atypical because, in their view, there is little that 
manufacturers can do to improve aircraft safety.50  But it is obvious 
that there are many ways in which aircraft manufacturers can make 
their planes safer, for instance by improving their structural integrity, 
adding backup features to their critical components (such as their 
landing gear), and designing them to be more resistant to stalling and 
spinning.  Airplanes are not qualitatively different from the multitude 
of complicated manufactured products for which all manner of steps 
can be taken to improve safety. 
Thus, results from an empirical study of the effect of product liabil-
ity on general aviation aircraft safety should be able to teach us some-
thing about the effect of liability on the safety of other products.  Sup-
pose, for example, that we were considering gas cooking ranges that, 
like general aviation aircraft, had to conform to rigorous safety re-
quirements and were purchased by consumers who well appreciated 
their risks.  Then we might reasonably predict from the results regard-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  47  Graham, supra note 28, at 185. 
  48  Graham recommended two reforms of product liability.  One was to reduce the scope of 
product liability by giving firms a defense against liability when they “promptly correct design 
defects and practice safety innovation.”  Id. at 186.  The other was to forbid confidentiality of 
product liability settlements in order to increase consumer information about product problems.  
Id. 
  49  See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 2, at 1932. 
   50  Goldberg and Zipursky say that “planes are unusual in that there is a complete overlap be-
tween the technology that is required for them to perform at all and the technology that is needed 
to prevent the occurrence of the most significant hazard that they pose.”  Id.  They follow this 
statement with a sentence that makes it clear that the significant hazard to which they are refer-
ring is crashing.  See id.  What Goldberg and Zipursky thus seem to mean is that if a plane is 
made such that it “perform[s] at all,” it will be made such that it will not crash.  If their statement 
does not have this interpretation, and their view is instead that safety can vary among airplanes 
that “perform at all” — that is, that the probability that planes will crash can vary — then their 
view is the one we articulate in the text, and their claim that airplanes are atypical would be  
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ing general aviation aircraft that product liability would also have lit-
tle effect on the safety of the gas cooking ranges. 
Similarly, Goldberg and Zipursky apparently believe that childhood 
vaccines are atypical because there is not much that manufacturers 
can do to make them safer.51  But the safety of a vaccine can be im-
proved through changes in its design (for instance, by employing an 
inactivated virus instead of an attenuated one), through the exercise of 
care in its manufacture (such as by preventing its contamination), and 
through the provision of warnings about its use.  Because vaccine 
manufacturers can affect product safety, something can be learned 
about the influence of product liability on product safety from the em-
pirical study of vaccines. 
Goldberg and Zipursky claim as well that we were selective in the 
empirical studies that we mentioned.52  Yet the only sense in which we 
were selective was that we focused on studies that examined the effect 
of product liability on actual accident rates.  We said that we were ex-
cluding surveys that asked company officials what steps they under-
took to improve product safety as a result of product liability, because 
such surveys do not measure the impact of liability on accident rates.53  
Moreover, surveys of this type are often of questionable reliability.  For 
example, two surveys undertaken by the U.S. Conference Board in 
consecutive years in the 1980s to evaluate the effect of product liability 
on firm behavior have been described as coming to markedly different 
results.54 
Finally, Goldberg and Zipursky stress that the empirical studies 
that we cite examine only the influence of the adoption of modern 
product liability law — that is, only the effect of “the shift from a neg-
ligence standard to a defect-based standard.”55  Hence, they suggest, it 
is possible that modern product liability law does not generate a safety 
benefit even though the prior law applicable to product accidents, 
which they describe as based on negligence, may have had a substan-
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  51  See id. at 1932–33 (stating that “the number of alternative design options available to manu-
facturers is limited by human biology, scientific knowledge, and FDA regulations” and that “man-
ufacturers . . . have limited ability to respond to the liability signal”). 
  52  See id. at 1932. 
  53  See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 1, at 1458 n.89.  In any case, were we to have considered 
surveys of this sort, it is doubtful that they would have affected our conclusions.  See infra note 
54. 
  54  See DEWEES, DUFF & TREBILCOCK, supra note 37, at 197–98 (discussing two national 
surveys undertaken by the U.S Conference Board in 1986 and 1987 “to evaluate the impact of 
product liability on firm behavior” and noting that “[t]he results of [the second] survey contrast 
markedly with those of the first”).  Dewees, Duff, and Trebilcock conclude their review of these 
surveys by observing that, while “the effect of tort law has not been insignificant, . . . [b]oth the 
presence of ‘adverse’ and ‘beneficial’ effects and the absence of cost-benefit evaluations preclude 
a conclusion as to whether increased product liability has enhanced efficient deterrence.”  Id. 
  55  Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 2, at 1933. 1962  HARVARD LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 123:1949 
tial beneficial effect on safety.56  This conjecture is implausible.  Sup-
pose that under the negligence standard firms were induced, as Gold-
berg and Zipursky hypothesize, to exercise various risk-reducing pre-
cautions in order to avoid being found liable for negligence.  Then, 
under the more expansive defect-based standard, firms should also 
have been induced to take various additional risk-reducing precautions 
in order to avoid being found liable for product defects.  If firms had 
done this, there would have been a reduction in product accident rates; 
yet the results of the empirical studies that we reviewed failed to find 
any effect of product liability on accident rates, contradicting the hy-
pothesis of Goldberg and Zipursky.57
II.  THE COMPENSATION BENEFIT OF PRODUCT LIABILITY 
We emphasized in our article that the compensation benefit of 
product liability is also incremental in nature.  Most individuals are 
already compensated to some, if not a substantial degree, for product-
related losses by first-party insurers.  We additionally explained that 
awards for pain and suffering lower individuals’ well-being because 
these awards effectively force individuals to purchase a type of insur-
ance that most do not want.  Goldberg and Zipursky criticize our 
analysis on both accounts in ways that we find unconvincing or   
mistaken. 
A.  The Incremental Nature of the Compensation Benefit 
In support of our point that individuals receive significant compen-
sation for product-related accidents from insurance, we observed that 
most Americans have private or public insurance coverage for medical 
expenses, loss of life, disability, and property damage.  We noted that 
about 85% of the population possesses health insurance, approximately 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  56  See id. 
  57  We elaborate here on the logic behind the argument just described.  Suppose that there are 
two important safety precautions, call them P1 and P2, which are cost-justified and which, ideally, 
would be undertaken by firms to reduce the risk of product defects.  But suppose that only P1 is 
required under the negligence standard either because courts are not cognizant of the desirability 
of P2 (for example, a court might not know that the rate at which soft drink bottles are cooled af-
ter being manufactured affects the likelihood of their later cracking and causing injury) or be-
cause courts cannot verify whether P2 was undertaken (a court might not be able to obtain relia-
ble evidence on the cooling rate).  Then, under Goldberg and Zipursky’s hypothesis that the 
negligence standard generates a substantial safety benefit, firms would be led to undertake P1 un-
der the negligence standard but would not be led to undertake P2.  However, if it is rational for 
firms to exercise precaution P1 under the negligence standard, it will also be rational for them to 
exercise P2 under the more expansive standard that holds them strictly liable for defect-caused 
injury.  Hence, an empirical finding that firms did not take precaution P2 under the defect-based 
standard is inconsistent with their taking precaution P1 under the negligence standard.  The em-
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78% of families own life insurance, at least one-third of the workforce 
holds some form of disability coverage, and 96% of homeowners have 
property insurance.58  Goldberg and Zipursky do not dispute these sta-
tistics, but they fault us for not discussing how many individuals have 
insufficient insurance relative to their losses.59  We did not claim, how-
ever, that insurance coverage was generally so high that there would 
be no compensation benefit from product liability.  We acknowledged 
in our article that “a significant minority [of Americans] lack coverage, 
and the level of coverage of those who have insurance may be substan-
tially less than their losses.”60 
Nonetheless, the level of coverage of individuals who have insur-
ance will often be adequate to compensate them for the majority of 
their losses.  For example, aside from deductibles and copayments, 
private health insurance reimburses individuals for most of their medi-
cal costs,61 and homeowner’s insurance typically covers the cost of re-
pairing or rebuilding a home that is damaged or destroyed by fire or 
other perils.62  More generally, because the losses that individuals suf-
fer in accidents lie along a continuum, most losses will not be extreme; 
our conjecture is that they will typically be less than the ceilings on in-
dividuals’ insurance policies.63  In other words, in the majority of cas-
es, insurance will be sufficient to cover losses after deductibles and co-
payments.  However, a qualification to this statement applies in the 
case of disability coverage, which is usually limited to approximately 
60% of an individual’s income.64 
We also observed in our article that individuals do not obtain as 
much compensation through the product liability system as might first 
appear.65  One reason is that subrogation provisions in first-party in-
surance policies often result in insurers collecting the settlements or 
judgments paid by defendants.  Another reason is that legal fees and 
delays in payment reduce the amount and the value of the compensa-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  58  Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 1, at 1462. 
  59  See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 2, at 1935. 
  60  Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 1, at 1463. 
  61  See CHRIS L. PETERSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., SETTING AND VALUING HEALTH 
INSURANCE  BENEFITS  4 ( 2009),  available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40491_200904 
06.pdf. 
  62  See Insurance Information Institute, What Is in a Standard Homeowners Insurance Poli-
cy?,  available at http://www.iii.org/Articles/What-is-in-a-standard-homeowners-insurance-policy 
.html (last visited May 7, 2010). 
  63  The theory of insurance suggests that risk-averse individuals would buy insurance policies 
that protect them against most losses, especially large ones.  See generally KENNETH J. ARROW, 
ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK-BEARING 134–43 (1971). 
  64  See Lawrence B. Keller & Harry R. Wigler, Disability Insurance Planning for Professionals, 
CPA J., Dec. 2007, at 54, 56 (“Most insurance companies will issue disability insurance coverage 
equal to approximately 60% of earned income.”). 
  65  See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 1, at 1463–65. 1964  HARVARD LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 123:1949 
tion that plaintiffs receive.  Goldberg and Zipursky do not disagree 
with these points. 
We then considered the value to individuals of the compensation 
that they obtain as a result of the product liability system.66  W e em-
phasized that the value of each dollar of compensation obtained 
through product liability tends to be less than the value of each dollar 
of compensation received through insurance.  The explanation is that 
insurance payments are typically received first and thus are presum-
ably used to satisfy a victim’s most pressing financial needs after an  
accident. 
Although Goldberg and Zipursky seem to accept this point in 
theory, they question its significance in practice.67  They state that the 
force of our claim “hinges on the actual slope of plaintiffs’ utility 
curves,”68 but do not acknowledge that we considered such curves.   
Specifically, we gauged the importance of our point using economists’ 
estimates of individuals’ utility curves, and calculated in an example 
that the value of a dollar received from the product liability system is 
only half of that received from insurance.69  Goldberg and Zipursky 
offer no evidence to counter what we illustrated. 
In sum, Goldberg and Zipursky do not contest our central point 
that the compensation benefit of product liability is limited because 
substantial compensation is already furnished by first-party insurers.  
They also do not dispute our observation that subrogation, legal fees, 
and delays detract from the compensation provided by product liabili-
ty.  Instead, they emphasize the incompleteness of insurance coverage, 
but do not provide evidence about the seriousness of this matter.  Fi-
nally, they question the significance of our claim that the value of 
product liability dollars received by injured parties is lower than that 
of insurance dollars, but they do not offer meaningful support for this 
criticism. 
B.  Nonmonetary Awards and the Compensation Benefit 
We explained in our article that product liability detrimentally af-
fects individuals to the extent that it compensates them for nonmone-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  66  See id. at 1466–67. 
  67  See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 2, at 1937–38. 
  68  Id. at 1937.  They also imply that the importance of our argument would be reduced if an 
individual received a small amount of compensation from insurance and a large amount of com-
pensation from the product liability system.  We see no reason why this would be so.  Imagine, for 
example, that an individual receives only a dollar of compensation from insurance and the re-
mainder of the compensation for her loss from product liability.  Then the dollar of compensation 
from insurance would have higher marginal utility — possibly much higher because it is the first 
dollar received — than the average marginal utility of the subsequent dollars received as a result 
of product liability. 
  69  See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 1, at 1466–67. 2010]  A SKEPTICAL ATTITUDE  1965 
tary losses, notably for pain and suffering.70  W e said that such com-
pensation tends to have relatively low value to individuals “because 
pain and suffering per se usually do not increase one’s need for mon-
ey.”71  The benefit of this compensation is more than offset by the in-
crease in product prices that results from firms’ having to pay pain 
and suffering damages.  Awarding such damages, we observed, is akin 
to forcing individuals to purchase insurance for nonmonetary losses, a 
type of insurance that they generally do not desire. 
Goldberg and Zipursky do not appear to disagree with this point in 
principle, but they doubt its import.  They begin by making a confused 
assertion.  They mistakenly say that we claim that “the consumer will 
be made worse off in an amount equal to the entire extra cost of the 
product attributable to the manufacturer’s having to stand ready to 
pay for pain and suffering damages.”72  In the illustration that we em-
ployed, to which they refer, the price of a product rose by $1000 be-
cause the manufacturer has to pay pain and suffering damages in the 
event of an accident.73  But contrary to the claim of Goldberg and  
Zipursky, we did not say that the consumer was made worse off by the 
price increase, here $1000.  Rather, we calculated that the loss in wel-
fare of the consumer in our example was $365.84.74 
Goldberg and Zipursky also suggest that our criticism of awards 
for nonmonetary losses is usually inapplicable in practice.  They argue 
that, even though the law allows awards for nonmonetary damages, 
this does not normally result in accident victims actually receiving 
more than their monetary losses.  The reason that Goldberg and Zi-
pursky give is that victims typically are compensated through settle-
ments rather than trial awards, and the settlement amounts are usually 
less than victims’ monetary losses.75  To illustrate their point, suppose 
that a victim’s monetary loss is $100,000, that she settles for $60,000, 
and that half of this settlement amount is attributable to her being 
able to claim damages for pain and suffering.  Then the $30,000 por-
tion of the settlement due to pain and suffering damages helps to com-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  70  See id. at 1467–69.  As we observed there, this point is well known in the economics litera-
ture.  See id. at 1468 n.125. 
  71  Id. at 1467. 
  72  Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 2, at 1939. 
  73  See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 1, at 1468. 
  74  Id. at 1468 & n.124.  Goldberg and Zipursky also say: “That the consumer would decline to 
spend $365.84 for pain and suffering insurance does not establish that she would pay nothing for 
it; rather it means that she would only pay some lower amount.”  Goldberg & Zipursky, supra 
note 2, at 1939 n.86.  This statement is wrong because its premise is incorrect.  It is not true that 
the consumer would decline to spend $365.84 for pain and suffering insurance.  In fact, she would 
be willing to spend more than $365.84 for such insurance (it can be inferred from our example 
that she valued the insurance at $634.16 because the product price rose by $1000 and she suffered 
a welfare loss of only $365.84).   
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pensate her for her monetary loss of $100,000; the right to receive pain 
and suffering damages at trial can thus function to augment her com-
pensation for her monetary loss.  Consequently, according to Goldberg 
and Zipursky, the award of pain and suffering damages usually is 
beneficial, not detrimental.76 
Although we agree with Goldberg and Zipursky that the award of 
damages for nonmonetary losses can lead, through the settlement 
process, to fuller compensation for monetary losses, we believe that 
this point is unlikely to be of great significance.  A victim will usually 
have some insurance, as we observed above,77 that will frequently 
compensate her for her monetary losses, apart from deductibles and 
copayments.  In this event, the victim’s receipt of the insurance pay-
ment will largely negate Goldberg and Zipursky’s point because there 
will be little need for further compensation for monetary losses.  Even 
if there is a shortfall in insurance coverage, the amount of the settle-
ment attributable to the claim for monetary losses will often cover the 
shortfall.78 
Additionally, the prospect of a nonmonetary award at trial may add 
enough to a settlement to overcompensate the victim for her monetary 
losses, and thus can reduce consumer well-being for the reasons that 
we provided in our article.  This possibility seems significant to us be-
cause pain and suffering damages are comparable in magnitude to 
monetary damages.79 
III.  THE BENEFIT-COST EVALUATION OF PRODUCT LIABILITY 
Having addressed Goldberg and Zipursky’s observations about the 
benefits of product liability, we now turn to consideration of the costs 
of product liability and the comparison of benefits to costs. 
We described in our article a number of studies that documented 
the high legal costs of tort liability.  These costs are approximately 
equal in magnitude to the payments that tort victims receive in com-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  76  See id. at 1940. 
  77  See supra pp. 1962–63. 
  78  Settlement proceeds are usually added to the victim’s insurance payment when that pay-
ment does not fully compensate her for monetary loss.  See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 1, at 
1464 n.108 (citing KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION 405–07 (4th 
ed. 2005); Alan O. Sykes, Subrogation and Insolvency, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 383, 385 (2001)); see 
also Tom Baker, Blood Money, New Money, and the Moral Economy of Tort Law in Action, 35 
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 275, 301–13 (2001).  Thus, to illustrate the possibility mentioned in the text, 
suppose that insurance covers $80,000 of a $100,000 monetary loss, so there is a $20,000 shortfall 
in compensation.  Then if the victim receives a settlement that includes (net of any legal fees) a 
$20,000 component due to her claim for monetary loss, she would be able to fill the gap in com-
pensation on account of that claim alone. 
  79  See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 1, at 1462 & n.98. 2010]  A SKEPTICAL ATTITUDE  1967 
pensation from defendants.80  We also discussed indirect costs stem-
ming from product price increases due to product liability.  These price 
increases can undesirably discourage consumers from buying prod-
ucts.81  For example, the higher price of the DPT vaccine attributed to 
product liability litigation has been estimated to have led to more than 
a million children going unvaccinated.82  We noted as well that manu-
facturers might withdraw socially valuable products from the market-
place as a result of their bearing the costs of litigation and of pain and 
suffering awards, and we suggested that this happened with general 
aviation aircraft.83 
Surprisingly, Goldberg and Zipursky ignore our entire discussion of 
the costs of the product liability system.84  But without comparing the 
benefits of product liability to its costs, one cannot assert, as they do, 
that the case for product liability is easy, unless one believes that costs 
do not matter.85  Obviously, if the product liability system were free to 
employ, the case for product liability would be immediate when prod-
uct liability has positive benefits.  But because the costs of the product 
liability system are so significant, they cannot be elided in a proper 
evaluation of product liability. 
Goldberg and Zipursky also assert that we face a heavy burden of 
proof in arguing that a skeptical attitude toward product liability is 
warranted on the basis of our benefit-cost analysis.86  The burden on 
us would indeed be substantial if the policy rationale for product lia-
bility put forth by its proponents were a serious one, the result of sus-
tained consideration of the benefits and costs of product liability. 
But we demonstrated in a major part of our article that the policy 
basis for product liability that courts and commentators have offered is 
essentially conclusory.87  Goldberg and Zipursky make no reference to 
our discussion of this matter.  We established that courts and commen-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  80  See id. at 1469–70. 
  81  See id. at 1470–72. 
  82  Id. at 1474 (citing Richard L. Manning, Is the Insurance Aspect of Producer Liability Val-
ued by Consumers? Liability Changes and Childhood Vaccine Consumption,  13 J.  RISK  & 
UNCERTAINTY 37, 47 (1996)). 
  83  See id. at 1475–76. 
  84  They make only two passing references to the costs of the liability system.  See Goldberg & 
Zipursky, supra note 2, at 1922 (noting that product liability law “is expensive and in some ways 
unpredictable”); id. at 25 (referring to “the expenses associated with the delivery of compensation 
via the tort system”).  Oddly, however, they devote an entire part of their response to a discussion 
of the costs of changing from one set of legal policies to another.  See id. at 1941–42 (Part IV titled 
“The Costs of Law Reform”). 
  85  As we observed in the preceding footnote, Goldberg and Zipursky do care about the costs of 
law reform.  We presume, therefore, that they would agree that the costs of the product liability 
system should be recognized as well. 
  86  See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 2, at 1935 (referring to the “heavy burden of persua-
sion set by Uneasy’s central thesis”). 
  87  See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 1, at 1476–85. 1968  HARVARD LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 123:1949 
tators simply presume that product liability yields a safety benefit; 
they do not generally recognize that market forces and regulation al-
ready encourage safety to a significant degree.  Similarly, courts and 
commentators typically assume that the product liability system pro-
vides victims with desirable compensation, but they nearly always 
omit mention of the point that first-party insurance exists.  Thus, they 
base their views of the benefits of product liability on simplistic as-
sumptions and, as a consequence, radically overstate these benefits.  At 
the same time, courts and commentators almost uniformly ignore the 
costs of the product liability system. 
Because the policy basis that has been developed for product liabil-
ity is so wanting, the burden required to question it cannot be said to 
be a substantial one.  We believe that our arguments and evidence eas-
ily meet this burden. 